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1964] ,NEW YORK PRACTICE COVERAGE 411
Section 308(4)- Service As Court Directs
Another ground for the motion to dismiss was that the
method of service made pursuant to section 308(4) was insufficient
to give notice. That section provides that personal service shall
be made upon a natural person "in such manner as the court,
upon motion without notice, directs, if service is impracticable under
paragraph one, two or three of this section." 19 Here the service
of the summons and complaint was made on the defendant's
literary agent, who represented the defendant in matters other
than those concerning the transaction which gave rise to the
present controversy. In sustaining the method of service, the
court stated that service under section 308(4) may be directed
to be made on a non-resident by service on his actual agent,
even though the agent is unconnected with the transaction out
of which the cause of action arose. It reasoned that "the actual
agent of such person must be regarded as cloaked with authority
to receive service and as the person calculated to give notice to
the defendant." 20
Although section 308(4) appears to be a "catchall section"
in that it allows a court to direct service in any adequate manner,
the Revisers did not intend it to be used too frequently. They
believed that it should only be employed where circumstances
indicated that service pursuant to subdivision (1), (2) or (3)
would be futile.2 '
Thus, the statute as enacted provides that section 308(4) may
be utilized only "if'service is impracticable under paragraph one,
two or three of this section." This conforms with the Revisers'
test of futility, because "impracticable" denotes infeasibility of
performance.
Bearing on the practicability of service under section 308(4)
is the authorization of section 313 to the effect that a "302 de-
fendant" may be served without the state in the same manner
as within. Thus, due to the existence of section 313, it might
have been held that service under section 308(4) should not
be authorized without a showing that service is impracticable out-
side the state, as well as within.2 2  The court in Totero, in sus-
19 CPLR § 308. (Emphasis added.)20 Totero v. World Telegram Corp., 41 Misc. 2d 594, 596, 245 N.Y.S.2d
870, 873 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
21 "Where it would be futile to attempt service by one of the above-
mentioned means, then the plaintiff may seek an order for some other
method of service.. . ." 1961 N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 15, FIFrTH REPORT To
THE LEGIsIAuan By THE SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE ON THE REVISION
OF THE CivxI PRucicE Acr 266 [hereinafter cited as FIFTH REP.].
22The "Practice Commentary" to McKinney's CPLR § 308 employs the
Revisers' test of futility and states that § 308(4) authorizes the court to
grant an order for service to be made in another manner "when all other
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taining service pursuant to section 308(4), holds in effect that an
endeavor to serve a defendant outside the state under section 313
is not a condition precedent to the use of section 308(4) .23
Section 302(a) (2) - Commission of a "Tortious Act"
Section 302 (a) (2) of the CPLR provides that a non-domicil-
iary is subject to in personam jurisdiction if the cause of action
arises out of his commission of a tortious act within the state.
An interesting case, and one which has taken a restrictive approach
to section 302 (a) (2), is Feathers v. McLucas.24
In that case, the defendant Darby Corporation, incorporated
under the laws of, and having its only place of business in
Kansas, had no direct contacts with New York. It manu-
factu-ed cargo pressure tanks used for the transportation of
liquefied petroleum products. Darby sold one of these tanks to a
Missouri corporation, having its principal place of business in
that state; this vendee affixed the tank to a trailer chassis and
wheels. The completed tank trailer was sold to a Pennsylvania
corporation engaged in interstate commerce. While this trailer
was being driven through New York to Vermont, the tank ruptured
and exploded, giving rise to an alleged cause of action for per-
sonal injuries and property damage. Relying on section 302(a) (2),
the plaintiff served the president of the defendant Darby Cor-
poration in Kansas, which is permissible under section 313
in a section 302 case. The defendant successfully moved to set
service aside (i.e., made a motion under rule 3211 (a) (8)), con-
tending that the court lacked in personam jurisdiction.
In resolving this issue, the court examined the cases decided
under the Illinois "longarm statute," Section 17 of the Illinois
Practice Act, on which section 302(a) is based, and adopted
the distinction between a tortious act and a tortious injury, as
drawn by a federal district court in Illinois in Hellriegel v. Sears
avenues have been exhausted unsuccessfully." 7B McKiNNEY's CPLR
§ 3C8, commentary 475.
23 The fact that § 308 (service in New York) precedes § 313 (service
outside New York) indicates that §308(4) clearly contemplates only the
exhaustion of in-state service under § 308(1)-(3) without reference to
extra-state service under § 313. In any event, that numerical position of
§ 308(4) offers good ground for such a determination. As a practical
matter, §308(4) might become a comparatively useless tool if, before an
order could be moved for under it, service in a foreign nation had to be
resorted to. If the service ordered under § 308(4) is such as to satisfy due
process-and in the Totero case the agent designated for service seemed
a reliable source to assure that the defendant would be notified- it seems
preferable to permit application for an order under § 308(4) without
requiring that extra-state service first be attempted under § 313.
2441 Misc. 2d 498, 245 N.Y.S.2d 282 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
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